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ABSTRACT 
The Department of Energy (DOE) has developed a set of 
containers for the handling, interim storage, transportation, and 
disposal in the national repository of DOE spent nuclear fuel (SNF). 
This container design, referred to as the standardized DOE SNF 
canister or standardized canister, was developed by the Department’s 
National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP) working in 
conjunction with the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 
Management (OCRWM) and the DOE spent fuel sites. This canister 
had to have a standardized design yet be capable of accepting virtually 
all of the DOE SNF, be placed in a variety of storage and 
transportation systems, and still be acceptable to the repository. 
Since specific design details regarding the storage, transportation, 
and repository disposal of DOE SNF were not finalized, the NSNFP 
recognized the necessity to specify a complete DOE SNF canister 
design. This allowed other evaluations of canister performance and 
design to proceed as well as providing standardized canister users 
adequate information to proceed with their work. 
 This paper is an update of a paper [1] presented to the 1999 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Pressure Vessels 
and Piping (PVP) Conference. It discusses recent progress achieved in 
various areas to enhance acceptance of this canister not only by the 
DOE complex but also fabricators and regulatory agencies. 
INTRODUCTION
The standardized canister is a container in which DOE SNF is to 
be placed. The goal of the standardized canister design is to simplify 
the handling of DOE SNF and meet applicable regulatory criteria. 
This canister must be capable of being integrated into: 
• a storage facility or storage cask 
• a transportation cask, and 
• a repository waste package. 
However, by itself, the DOE SNF canister is not a storage cask or 
storage facility per 10 CFR Part 72 [2], not a transportation cask per 
10 CFR Part 71 [3], nor a repository waste package per 10 CFR Part 
63 [4]. The intent of the design was to have the standardized canister 
be incorporated into interim storage facilities (acting as one of the 
confinement barriers if necessary), be placed into an approved 
transportation cask during transportation (acting as an inner 
containment if necessary), and being placed into a repository waste 
package for final disposal (acting as a confinement barrier during 
canister handling at the surface facility). The most stringent 
requirements from either of these three uses had to be imposed on the 
canister since there was to be only one standardized canister design. 
It should be kept in mind that DOE SNF is unlike commercial 
fuel. DOE SNF is typically highly enriched fuel, having a variety of 
shapes and sizes, and a significant portion is damaged (as defined in 
NUREG-1617 [5]). Therefore, the precise requirements deemed 
necessary by a regulatory agency may be more rigorous than those 
currently in place for commercial SNF. 
BACKGROUND 
The design for the standardized canister had to consider a number 
of issues. To maintain simplicity, efficiency, and to keep costs low, 
the intent was to have these canisters envelope the SNF but not 
provide numerous safety features, such as shielding. Other 
components (including the interim storage facilities, transportation 
casks, and the repository waste packages) could be relied upon to 
provide these other safety functions. Simple fabrication, without 
expensive machining, was the objective of the canister design. 
Although the goal was to shift various safety functions onto other 
facilities or components, the potential still existed that when these 
canisters are being handled by themselves, they could be accidentally 
dropped. This means that the standardized canister has to be 
sufficiently robust to withstand anticipated operational loads and at 
least confine the DOE SNF after an accidental drop event. Therefore, 
providing some means of protecting these canisters during potential 
drop events was a significant design consideration. However, the lack 
of shielding meant that workers could not be relied upon to easily
attach and remove external impact limiters. In addition, the physical
presence of external impact limiters could potentially impose
unnecessary handling restrictions and excessive usage of limited
space. Therefore, the use of removable external impact limiters was
deemed undesirable. However, this increased concern over the ability
of the standardized canisters to satisfy desired performance objectives
during potential accidental drop events.
Since most of the DOE spent fuel sites did not have finalized 
plans in place regarding interim storage, transportation cask details
were not finalized, and the repository design was not finalized, 
progress toward designing a standardized canister was difficult. 
However, DOE spent fuel sites and repository personnel wanted 
detailed standardized canister information for their own planning 
purposes.
Therefore, the NSNFP decided to write a preliminary design
specification [6] that would identify specific canister geometry with a
robust design as well as include a number of significant repository
requirements (though not yet finalized). This would allow the NSNFP
to proceed with certain aspects of gaining repository acceptance of the 
standardized canister design. It would also permit initial contracts to 
be awarded to begin the process of placing DOE SNF into dry storage. 
With a clear focus on future use, the preliminary design
specification required the standardized canister to be N-stamped per 
the criteria of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code, 
Section III, Division 3 [7]. The basis for this requirement is that the 
standardized DOE SNF canister can then function (as necessary) as
the inner containment system for transporting damaged SNF with 
more than 20 Curies (0.74 terabecquerels) of plutonium, based on the 
guidance provided in Section 4.5.1.3 of NUREG-1617. Because the 
current decision is to allow the various DOE sites to procure the
standardized canisters on an as-needed basis over the next several
decades, imposing ASME Section III, Division 3 criteria results in 
appropriate quality assurance controls for the construction of these 
canisters. The preliminary specification acknowledged that 
modifications to Division 3 rules were necessary before actual Code 
construction and stamping could be accomplished. At first, a Code 
Case was envisioned but after discussions with ASME Code 
personnel, permanent Code changes were considered more 
appropriate.
To address the increased concerns over the drop response of the
standardized canister with no external impact limiter, the canister 
design incorporated an integral energy-absorbing skirt (Figures 1 and
2) that deforms on impact during an accidental drop event, providing 
significant protection to the containment system of the canister. The 
skirt helps to protect the canister containment system in virtually all 
accidental drop events by absorbing impact energy. Only when the 
canister impacts in a horizontal (flat) orientation does the skirt not 
absorb significant energy. However, in horizontal orientations, the 
entire length of the canister is then able to absorb the drop energy. A 
deformed skirt can be removed if necessary without disrupting the 
canister containment system, enhancing the canister’s ability to still fit 
into other containers. 
The standardized DOE SNF canister design has two nominal 
diameters [18 inches (457 mm) and 24 inches (610 mm)] and two 
nominal lengths [10 feet (3.00 m) and 15 feet (4.57 m)], and is made 
of 316L stainless steel. The nominal wall thickness is 0.375 inches 
(9.53 mm) for the 18-inch (457-mm) diameter canister, and 0.500
inches (12.7 mm) for the 24-inch (610-mm) diameter canister.
Although a 50 psig (344.8 kPa) internal pressure was established for
design conditions [22 psig (151.7 kPa) operational], the standardized 
DOE SNF canister actually has the capability of withstanding a much
higher pressure limit [working pressure of about 350 psig (2.41 MPa)].
This is just one example of the robust design of the standardized DOE 
SNF canister.
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Figure 1.  Canister Overall Design (Section View)
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Figure 2.  Smaller Canister Lower End Cross Section
RECENT PROGRESS 
In 1998, the standardized canister design was established in the
preliminary design specification. Since then, multiple developments
have occurred which have demonstrated its robust performance and 
enhance the acceptability of the standardized canister. 
1999 Drop Testing
Even though the standardized canister design has skirts that 
absorb significant amounts of impact energy, the skirts are made from 
stainless steel pipe and do not cushion the standardized canister 
enough, when subjected to a 30-foot (9-m) accidental drop of the 
canister by itself, to permit compliance with the stress limits for a 
hypothetical accident condition established by the ASME B&PV 
Code, Section III, Division 3 or the stress limits for a Level D Service 
Condition established by Section III, Division 1 [8]. Therefore, 
whenever the standardized canister was to be handled by itself, the 
design intent was to let the facility provide any required confinement 
function in the event of an accidental drop. However, the NSNFP still 
believed it was necessary to demonstrate the actual response of the 
standardized canister to a 30-foot (9-m) drop event. If full 
functionality could be demonstrated, the robust design of the 
standardized canister would be established. 
During 1999, the NSNFP funded the fabrication of nine full–
sized, 18-inch (457-mm) diameter test canisters. The goal was to drop 
these test canisters to assess their structural performance, to 
demonstrate the resulting integrity of the pressure boundary and leak 
tightness of the containment after the drop tests, and to see how 
accurately computer predictions could be made of the resulting plastic 
deformations. The results of this effort were presented to the 2000 
ASME PVP Conference [9]. Summarizing, the resulting deformations 
were within acceptable limits, the test canisters were all proven to be 
able to maintain the structural integrity of the pressure boundary, the 
four worst-damaged test canisters were helium leak tested and were 
found to be leaktight [10] with helium leak rates less that 10-7 std 
cc/sec, and the computer predictions accurately matched the resulting 
deformations, many times within 5% or less variance. The ability of 
the standardized canister to maintain a leaktight containment after a 
30-foot drop event enhances its acceptability. These results may also 
be useful to facilities that do not provide the full confinement function 
necessary to satisfy regulatory criteria. 
Friction Parameter Determination
Although this specific effort is still under evaluation, preliminary 
results from a scientific investigation in 2001 have indicated that the 
value of friction (between the dropped component and the impact 
surface) used in accidental drop analyses can have a significant affect 
on the predicted structural results. The scientific investigation dropped 
identical test specimens at different angles of impact from a consistent 
40-foot (12.2-m) drop height. Computer predictions were made to 
determine which appropriate friction factors best matched the actual 
resulting deformations from each drop test. 
Surprisingly, the analysis determined friction values shifted from 
0.025 to nearly 1.0 as the impact angle increased from nearly vertical 
(14 degrees) to approaching horizontal (62 degrees). These 
preliminary results were surprising since the analytically determined 
friction values were much different than those typically published in 
engineering handbooks for steel on steel (typically 0.45 to 0.60). The 
preliminary results of this scientific investigation were presented to 
the 2001 ASME PVP Conference [11]. Additional drop tests using 
different test specimen geometries have been completed but funding 
limitations have delayed the full evaluation of these other drop tests. 
The significance of these preliminary results is that many safety 
evaluations for accidental drop events are based on computer analysis 
predictions. However, the analysis methodology used may yield non-
conservative results. The analyst must be aware of the significance of 
the friction values used in such analyses. The ultimate goal of this 
scientific investigation is to establish the appropriate friction values 
for the standardized canister so that all associated drop analyses 
performed yield the correct results. 
ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Division 3 Revisions
As identified in the preliminary design specification, certain 
revisions to the ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Division 3, 
Subsections WA and WB were necessary before the standardized 
canister could be fabricated to Code criteria and N-stamped. All of the 
revisions were necessary due to the fact that the containment would 
not be completed until after the SNF or other radioactive material has 
been loaded into the canister and the final closure weld completed. 
The Code revisions identified as necessary to permit canister 
construction were: 
1. Allowing an alternative procedure that permitted applying the N-
stamp prior to final completion of the containment due to 
personnel exposure concerns once SNF or other radioactive 
materials have been loaded into the canister, 
2. Allowing field operations in order to complete the final closure 
weld at a location other than the Code shop, 
3. Allowing ultrasonic testing to be an acceptable method for 
volumetric examination of the Category B final closure weld, and 
4. Once loaded with SNF, substituting a helium leak test for the 
mandatory pressure test due to safety concerns. 
Note that these changes are applicable to storage containments as well 
as inner containments for transportation. 
Most of these Code changes have already been achieved. 
Currently, in the 2001 Edition, WA-8311 specifies alternative 
stamping requirements, WA-8151 permits field operations, and WB-
5279 allows the use of ultrasonic examination plus liquid penetrant or 
magnetic particle examination when environmental conditions (e.g., 
background radiation from the loaded SNF or other radioactive 
materials) do not permit radiographic examination to be performed. 
Discussions are currently being held in the Subgroup NUPACK 
(responsible for Section III, Division 3 rules) to revise WB-6000, 
allowing the substitution of helium leak testing for pressure testing 
under certain conditions. 
In addition to the Division 3 changes discussed above, Subgroup 
NUPACK is also currently writing rules for storage containments. The 
goal is to issue these new rules for storage containments and eliminate 
Nuclear Code Case N-595 [12], the Division 1 Code Case that 
currently allows storage containments to be built under Division 1, 
Subsection NB rules as modified by the Code Case. Tentatively 
identified as a new Subsection WC for Division 3, these new storage 
containment rules are expected to be similar to the Subsection WB 
rules for transportation containments. Since the standardized canister 
is to be an N-stamped, Division 3 inner containment for transportation, 
using the standardized canister as a Division 3 storage containment is 
expected to be a viable option. 
Repository Acceptance
The repository, being designed under the direction of OCRWM, 
has been designated to receive both civilian and federal government 
(DOE) radioactive spent nuclear fuels. Addressing just the DOE 
aspects of the repository design, the concept of co-disposal is being 
pursued. Under co-disposal, five 24-inch (610-mm) vitrified high level 
waste containers will be placed into the repository’s waste package. A 
center hole will result when the five vitrified canisters are placed in a 
circular pattern. This center hole is where the canistered DOE SNF is 
to be placed. Hence, the term co-disposal, meaning both DOE high 
level waste and DOE SNF are to be placed into the same waste 
package.
In late 1998, the standardized canister design was accepted for 
use at the repository, assuming the final waste acceptance criteria will 
be satisfied at the time of DOE SNF transport to the repository. The 
preliminary design specification included specific repository 
acceptance criteria [13] known at that time, including (1) a maximum 
internal canister pressure of 22 psig (151.7 kPa), (2) canister materials 
to be low-carbon austenitic stainless steel or stabilized stainless steel, 
(3) sealed canisters backfilled with inert gas, (4) unique alphanumeric 
identifier on each canister, (5) the capability of a canister to stand 
upright on a flat surface without support, (6) damaged or deformed 
canisters still maintaining a seal, still capable of being lifted and 
moved, and still meeting the dimensional envelope required for 
loading into a waste package, and (7) a canister able to be vertically 
lifted with remote lifting fixtures. 
The standardized canister was incorporated into the repository’s 
Interface Control Document [14], a document meant to provide 
envelope measurements of all significant components in order to 
assure proper interfaces and fits. Later, the repository also completed a 
study (referred to as the performance allocation study) to evaluate the 
performance of a number of canisters expected to be received at the 
repository. Based on the results of the 1999 drop testing effort, the 
standardized canister’s drop performance was superior to less robust 
canisters that drove the surface facility design and the expected 
handling and operating procedures for DOE SNF. 
The most recent repository waste acceptance criteria [15] appears 
to be less prescriptive. Rather than many specific limitations, the 
current criteria reflects a philosophy that if the DOE SNF can be 
transported to the repository in a sealed canister and that canister can 
adequately perform its required safety functions (e,g, contains or 
adequately confines the SNF after an accidental drop event) prior to 
being loaded into a waste package, the repository will accept that 
DOE SNF. The NSNFP firmly believes that the standardized canister 
fulfills these criteria. 
ASME Division 3 Nuclear Code Case
In order to timely support an existing DOE SNF storage contract 
that was identified to use the standardized canister, an ASME Nuclear 
Code Case was generated. This Division 3 Nuclear Code Case, 
tentatively identified as N-656, is similar to the Division 1 Nuclear 
Code Case N-595, written for storage canisters. However, it was 
specially written to apply to only an inner containment for 
transportation, as identified in NUREG-1617. Formal issuance of this 
Division 3 Nuclear Code Case is expected by the end of 2002. 
Code Case N-656 includes ten items and requires (1) the final 
closure weld to be a full penetration weld, (2) final closure welds be 
exempted from pressure tests provided a helium leak test is performed 
with an acceptable leakage rate no greater than 10-4 std cc/sec, (3) 
buckling and instability evaluations follow Division 1, NB-3133 
requirements, (4) inelastic analyses for Level D operating conditions, 
including those associated with accidental drops, follow the rules in 
Appendix F, (5) the dimensions of standard items comply with 
Division 1, Table NB-3132-1, (6) Section III, Division 3, 2001 Edition 
or later shall be used, (7) the requirements of WA-8152 are applicable 
to the inner transportation containment final closure weld, (8) 
definitions in terminology provided in Subsection WA take 
precedence over Subsection WB, (9) the stress limits shall be in 
accordance with WB-3000 except that primary stresses for Level B 
operating limits may be in accordance with NB-3223(a) and primary 
stresses for Level C operating limits may be in accordance with Figure 
NB-3224 –1, and (10) the Code Case number shall be indicated on the 
Code Data Report. 
Many of the Division 3 Code Case items may appear confusing 
by referring to Division 1 or specifying that rules or definitions in 
Subsection WA have precedence over Subsection WB. The reason for 
these clarifications is that the 2001 Edition of Subsection WB still 
needs to be modified to match the recently revised Subsection WA 
and to clarify the use of rules that currently exist in Division 1 that are 
expected to be incorporated into Division 3, Subsection WB rules 
sometime in the near future. Item (7) of the Division 3 Code Case is 
necessary to take advantage of a recent change in Subsection WA that 
was inadvertently restricted to storage containments. 
10 CFR 71.63 Changes
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
undertook efforts to revise the double containment ruling as specified 
in 10 CFR 71.63(b) in order to establish compatibility with 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) standards. The basis for 
the separate inner containment (i.e., the “double containment”) rule 
dates back to 1974 when the Atomic Energy Commission believed 
that safety would be significantly enhanced if plutonium in excess of 
20 Curies (0.74 terabecquerels) were being shipped. The proposed rule 
change, identified as Issue 17, was established in a Federal Register 
notice [16]. The NRC staff later documented their position in SECY-
01-0035 [17]. Summarizing, the NRC believed that a single Type B 
containment barrier is adequate for all transportation packages. This 
rule making process is still in progress. It should be noted that the 
NRC did not change the requirement to ship plutonium (in excess of 
20 Curies) as a solid, per 10 CFR 71.63(a). 
Although the design basis of the standardized canister was to 
perform this inner containment function during transportation of 
damaged SNF with plutonium in excess of 20 Curies (0.74 
terabecquerels), the possible elimination of the double containment 
rule does not eliminate the need to have nuclear quality construction 
for the standardized canister. Having a certified, N-stamped 
transportation inner containment still means that (1) incorporating the 
standardized canister into a 10 CFR 72 approved storage facility is 
easier, especially if damaged DOE SNF is to be stored, (2) 
transporting either intact or damaged DOE SNF or other radioactive 
materials is still more easily achieved with additional qualified 
barriers in place, and (3) the repository still expects to receive DOE 
SNF in sealed canisters of sufficient quality and structural integrity as 
to be able to withstand a repository defined potential accidental drop 
event and still contain or adequately confine the material. Regardless 
of this regulation change, the NSNFP will stay with its original design 
approach for the standardized canister since the result is an additional 
barrier, increased safety, and the prevention of major programmatic 
perturbations if a double containment requirement is ultimately 
imposed for DOE SNF. 
Flaw Evaluation Work
The 1999 drop testing effort confirmed the ability of an 18-inch 
(457-mm) diameter standardized canister (in an essentially flaw-free 
condition) to maintain a leaktight containment after an accidental drop 
event. Starting in 2002 and carrying over into 2003, the NSNFP is 
funding a preliminary scientific investigation to evaluate the ability of 
a standardized canister with a flaw to maintain a containment system 
after an accidental drop event at the repository. The 1999 drop testing 
effort used test canisters that are expected to reflect the actual 
condition of the standardized canisters since the ASME Code, Section 
III fabrication requirements should produce a canister without 
significant flaws. However, if for any reason (after fabrication or 
during use), a flaw does develop in a standardized canister, this testing 
would address such an unexpected situation. 
The maximum anticipated acceptable flaw size, determined using 
analytical fracture mechanics methods and past metallurgical test 
results, used worst-case stress values resulting in a standardized 
canister dropped vertically 23 feet (7 m), a repository defined drop 
event. The result was an elliptical-shaped flaw of significant size, 
approximately 2 inches (5.1 cm) long and 0.20 inches (0.51 cm) deep. 
This size of flaw or crack, more than halfway through the nominal 
0.375-inch (9.53-mm) wall thickness, can be easily detected using a 
variety of nondestructive examination techniques. If it can be shown 
through demonstration testing that flaws of this detectable size, in 
either base or weld metal, do not propagate through the wall under the 
expected drop event loads, the robust design of the standardized 
canister has once again been demonstrated. 
FUTURE EFFORTS 
The NSNFP has initiated efforts to understand standardized 
canister aging mechanisms that could adversely affect performance 
over its design life. Studies are underway to examine hydrogen 
generation that might affect standardized canister pressurization and 
material embrittlement. The NSNFP is working with the American 
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) to define a drying standard 
for SNF that will significantly reduce the amount of water to levels 
that would be of no concern for aging issues. Detrimental effects from 
the SNF and fission products are also being investigated. 
Even with the robust design of the standardized canister, during 
certain accident scenarios, ASME Code Level D stress limits can be 
exceeded. However, no containment failures have been observed or 
measured during standardized canister drop tests. The standardized 
canister can experience high strains but still maintain a containment. A 
white paper is being developed jointly by OCRWM and the NSNFP 
this year, providing an acceptance basis for canister integrity with high 
strain values. Future meetings are planned with the NRC to fully 
discuss the use of strain criteria to determine the suitability of a 
canister after a drop accident. 
CONCLUSIONS
The past few years have seen a number of changes in the ASME 
B&PV Code, federal regulations, and repository requirements that 
could affect the standardized canister. However, the standardized 
canister is still expected to provide the DOE complex with a viable 
tool to address the handling, storage, transportation, and repository 
disposal of DOE SNF and other radioactive materials. All 
accomplishments to date continue to indicate that the standardized 
canister can indeed perform its intended functions with safety margins. 
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